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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND 
DESCRIBING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
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A p p e l l a n t s and Auuei in i1 • iLdL;iii t s x t s t h e r e o f . 
STATEMENT OF AND FACTS Ot THE CASE 
P l e a s e , r e i e . 
• ) t " I 1 .rJJH !' . 
i of flrief of R e s p o n d e n t s / C r o s s -
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IN REPLY BRIEF 
Defendants/Cross-Appellants address herein the issues raised 
by Harrison which are the subject of defendants1 cross-appeal. 
The fact that any issue is not specifically argued in this reply 
brief should not be interpreted as agreement with Mr. Harrison's 
arguments. The lack of comment means only that the issue not 
discussed was part of the Harrison appeal to which defendants are 
not entitled further briefing or issues that defendants believe 
need no further comment. 
Point One of this Reply Brief contests the standard of 
review argued by Mr. Harrison. The standard of review for this 
Court in interpreting law is the "correction of error" standard. 
No deference or weight should be given to Commission experience 
and expertise in dealing with the add-on attorneys' fees issue. 
That is especially true when the experience and practice of the 
Commission for more than 70 years has been to interpret the 
enabling legislation, Section 35-1-87, U.C.A. and its 
predecessors, exactly as the Supreme Court did in Graham v. 
Industrial Commission, 495 P.2d 806 (Utah 1972), i.e. attorneys' 
fees should come from the award and not be in addition to the 
award. 
Point Two herein replies to Mr. Harrison's unsupported 
assertion that the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah, Section 35-
1-1 et seq. "mandates" that his attorney's fees be added to his 
award. The statutes cited by Mr. Harrison are silent on that 
2 
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requires a fair opportunity to all parties to argue points of 
law; present evidence against unsupported factual findings; to not 
have a trial judge argue in support of his order before an 
appellate or reviewing body, especially out of the presence of the 
parties; and to not have nonparties participate in the process 
without notice and an opportunity to rebut nonparty arguments. 
The majority of the Commission and Mr. Harrison do not view such 
conduct as inappropriate. Such practices appear to be 
longstanding and widespread. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THIS COURT IS A 
"CORRECTION OF ERROR STANDARD" AND NOT ONE OF 
"GIVING CONSIDERABLE WEIGHT TO THE 
COMMISSION'S INTERPRETATION OF LAW. 
In point II of Mr. Harrison's brief he states that the 
standard of review for this court is one giving "deference to the 
Industrial Commission's expertise and experience." (See Point II 
at page 5 of Appellant's Reply Brief.) However, that is not the 
standard for statutory interpretation. In State Tax Commission 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051 at 1052 (Utah 
1984), the Supreme Court of Utah stated the standard which should 
apply when interpreting the statutory parameters of the 
Commission's power and authority: 
4 
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deference given to tJie expertise of £h& 
In reviewing questions of fact, 
o J great degree to the 
Commission, 
we defer 
Commission's findings and reverse only where 
they are without foundation in the evidence. 
In determining whether the Commission 
correctly applied the findings of basic facts 
to the legal rule governing the case., we wiJ 1 
uphold the Commission, so long as its decision 
was reasonable in light of the language of the 
statute, the purpose it aims tc achieve and 
the public policy behind :* --<•,* oris 
omit^d^ emphasis added) 
In d" ot her aAvn n i s*- rar • * upreme °ourt 
amplified -r • review this Cuurt si * i.L; apply * **e 
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i\ XI-J -i;i l i l t 
In reviewing the Comniit u i o11" i 
interpretations of general questions of law, 
this Court applies a correction-of-error 
standard, with no deference to the expertise 
of the Commission, General questions of law 
include interpretation of the United States 
Constitution and the Acts of Congress, and 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution and 
the Acts of the Legislature. •. 
Examples of thii' • • t -..^  n-of-errors type of 
review include whether the Commission has 
complied with the fairness requirements of due 
process , whether the Commis sion has acted 
5 
beyond its statutory jurisdiction or 
authority,... 
* * * 
[Regarding] questions of general law.*.this 
Court acts without deference to the decision 
of the Commission because the Court has 
comparatively greater qualifications on these 
questions... 
658 P.2d at 608 (emphasis added) (footnotes deleted) 
The Utah Department of Administrative Service# supra, Court 
went on to discuss in what circumstances deference should be 
accorded Public Service Commission decisions. Varying degrees of 
deference are accorded Commission findings on basic facts (which 
can only be overturned if they are "without foundation in fact") 
and an intermediate area variously called "mixed questions of law 
and fact" or "the 'application1 of the findings of basic 
facts...to the legal rules governing the case" (which 
"...decisions must fall within the limits of reasonableness or 
rationality."). (See 658 P.2d at 608-610). Only the "correction 
of error" standard is appropriate to the interpretation of the 
general law of add-on attorneys1 fees. 
The principal case cited by plaintiff for the proposition 
that this court should defer to the experience or expertise of the 
Industrial Commission actually stands for the opposite. In 
Bennett v. Industrial Commission, 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986), the 
court in the clearest of terms set forth the standard when the 
underlying facts of a case are not in dispute: 
6 
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award given an injured employee. That is a legal issue for this 
Court to decide. 
POINT TWO 
NO UTAH WORKERS1 COMPENSATION STATUTE MANDATES 
NOR DOES ONE GIVE THE COMMISSION IMPLIED 
AUTHORITY TO ADD ATTORNEYS1 FEES ON TO AN 
INJURED EMPLOYEE'S AWARD 
Notwithstanding Mr. Harrison's unsupported assertions to the 
contrary, no statute in the Workers' Compensation Act of Utah 
"mandates" payment as a cost against employers and their 
insurers, injured employee's attorneys' fees in contested cases 
before the Commission. (See Harrison's Reply Brief at argument 
points V, VI, VII.) Each and every statute cited by the injured 
employee, is silent on the "add-on" issue. 
Section 35-1-87 U.C.A. which gives the Commission authority 
to "...regulate and fix fees of such attorneys" mentions 
absolutely nothing about taxing such fees as a cost or penalty 
against the employer or its insurance carrier. 
Harrison attempts to sidestep the immutable interpretation of 
that statute by the Utah Supreme Court in Graham v. Industrial 
Commission 26 Utah 2d 424f 491 P.2d 223 (1971) and 27 Utah 2d 279, 
495 P.2d 806 (1972) by saying, "...The two Graham cases when read 
together merely apply, and are limited to, cases involving the 
resolution of third-party suits pursuant to Section 35-1-62 
[U.C.A.]." (See Harrison's Reply Brief at Argument Point X page 
14) That simply is not the case. The Court specifically 
interpreted Section 35-1-87 U.C.A. as it applies generally to the 
8 
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amount ba^c > , , JJready established Commission rule, what 
„! case does demonstrate is the Commission rrarl • . p n ^ ot 
over severity years dura* n " »',''!,, attorneys1 fees from the 
&wa i u_ ul the recipient employee and not adding them to the award > 
Compensation Sections 15-1-4S "" ,'. A , ;oinpnii at i ledical 
expenses, • funeia! ^M'^i^*" ' IM," paid by employees and/or 
their '« i'i|uiies caused by accidents arisinq OIM 
Ilit- course of employment), l"1" 1 bf\ "u "i h i i niiporary lutal 
disability) , 35-1-65,, I " '" / • i11 eiiipoi ary partial disability), 35-
disability)f 35-1-65.1 U.C.A. (temporary partial disability), 35-
1-66 U.C.A. (permanent partial disability)f 35-1-67 U.C.A. 
(permanent total disability) and 35-1-68 U.C.A. (death benefits) 
again, contrary to Mr. Harrison's assertions, do not enlarge upon 
the Commission's enabling legislation regarding attorneys' fees. 
Each is advisedly silent on the issue directly, inferentially and 
otherwise. If the legislature had a different intent, it could 
have so stated. 
Harrison states at page 19 of his reply brief, "this Court 
must determine the meaning of said section [Section 35-1-87 
U.C.A.] and the failure to pass certain bills by the State 
Legislature will not help this Court resolve the issues raised in 
this appeal." It is hornbook law that an important element in 
interpreting statutes is to discover the legislative intent. 
Often, when the Supreme Court interprets law, the legislature will 
amend the interpreted statute to meet certain perceived political 
and/or policy needs. That is part of the balancing of power in a 
democratic form of government. Therefore, if the legislature 
chooses to vote for or against or not to vote at all on a bill 
designed to give an administrative agency certain powers, that is 
very probative of legislative intent. As pointed out in the Amici 
Curiae brief of the Utah Manufacturers Association at pages 4-6 
and at pages 30 to 31 of Defendants/Cross-Appellants' Brief, the 
1985 Utah Legislature failed to pass proposed House Bills 186 and 
332 which would have given the Industrial Commission authority to 
add-on attorneys' fees. 
10 
Even more recently, in 1989, after the appeal of the issues 
in this matter, the Legislature considered Senate Bill 147. That 
bill would have given the Industrial Commission the authority it 
has attempted to bestow upon itself by judicial decision. Senate 
Bill 147 failed to pass the Senate on Second Reading on February 
15, 1989. (See Addendum One for a copy of the bill, its 
legislative history and a newspaper article reflecting the fact 
that Mr. Harrison and his counsel appeared before a Senate 
Committee hearing and presented testimony concerning these issues. 
The Committee was considering the appointment of a new 
Commissioner.) The legislature has answered Mr. Harrison's 
request for an additional benefit with a resounding "no" just as 
has the Supreme Court in Graham, supra. 
Mr. Harrison wants the Court of Appeals to believe Professor 
Arthur Larson's most learned treatise provides "[no] guidance to 
this Court [and does not] support Respondent's argument." 
(Harrison Reply Brief at page 15). However, Professor Larson 
instructs us on the proper method to enact an add-on fee if that 
is the policy to be established. It is definitely not done by 
quasi-judicial fiat from an administrative agency. The basic rule 
in workers' compensation law is that each party pays its own 
lawyer. All variations of that theme have come by express, 
detailed legislative enactment. No attempt to accomplish that end 
judicially has been successful in the United States. Professor 
Larson lists cases from 9 states to support the above contention. 
He also lists a significant number of states that have statutorily 
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addressed the issue, the proper way to change the Workers1 
Compensation Act* (See Brief of Respondent Cross-Appellant at 
pages 26, 27 and 47) (See A.Larson, Worker's Compensation Law 
Section 83 pp. 15-1270 to 15-1290.) 
POINT THREE 
THE COMMISSION ORDER IN THIS CASE DID VIOLATE 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING ACT OF UTAH EVEN 
IF, ARGUENDO, SECTION 35-1-67 U.C.A. GIVES IT 
THE DISCRETION TO ESTABLISH AN ADD-ON 
ATTORNEYS' FEE. 
It is true that final judicial decisions on principles of law 
prescribing or proscribing the bounds of an administrative 
agency's authority require promulgation of appropriate conforming 
rules. Section 63-46a-3(6) U.C.A. (See Harrisons' Reply Brief at 
Argument Point XI pages 16 & 17) That does not mean that the 
Commission has authority as stated in its Order to "...articulate 
a clear policy for the first time regarding the payment of 
attorney fees..." by judicial decision. (The Commission also 
acknowledged that its practice has always been to have each party 
pay their own attorneys' fees. See Commission's Order Affirming 
Supplemental Order Page Two, Addendum 3 to Brief of 
Defendants/Cross-Appellants). By definition," 'policy' means a 
statement applying to persons or agencies that...broadly 
prescribes a future course of action, guidelines, principles or 
procedures..." Section 64-46a-2(10)(a) U.C.A. (emphasis added). 
It is very significant when a seventy plus year Administrative 
policy affecting all employers, all compensation insurance 
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carriers and all injured employees in the State of Utah is 
changed. The bottom line is that making such a change may 
materially affect rates for workers1 compensation insurance in 
Utah. It will have a substantial affect on reserves for past 
cases because of its retroactive nature. The Commission is not 
empowered to manipulate its critical rules on whim and fancy. The 
Supreme Court has spoken concerning such manipulation of rules by 
administrative agencies in judicial settings. In State# by and 
through Department of Community Affairs v. Utah Merit System 
Council/ 614 P.2d 1259r the Court chastised the defendant agency 
for its conduct at a hearing in which it excluded the plaintiff's 
representative because the representative was also a witness. The 
Court's comments are very telling in the situation before us now: 
...Defendants contend that the procedural 
rules are merely 'guidelines/1 but 
administrative regulations are presumed to be 
reasonable and valid and cannot be ignored or 
followed by the agency to suit its own 
purposes. Such is the essence of arbitrary 
and capricious action. Without compelling 
grounds for not following its rules. an agency 
must be held to them... (citations 
omitted)(emphasis added) 
The Commission did not follow its own rule 490-1-4. 490-1-4 
when passed and ever since has been uniformly interpreted by the 
Commission and all its administrative law judges as setting 
guidelines by which applicants should pay their attorneys for 
their legal services from the award. Section 63-46a-3(6) U.C.A. 
does not give the Commission free reign to judicially manipulate 
its rules. If that were the case, the Utah Administrative Rule 
Making Act requirements which are designed to ensure a fair 
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hearing of rule changes to a wide spectrum of those affected would 
be a sham and of no substance. (See Brief of Defendants/Cross-
Appellant at Argument Point Three pp. 31-35 for a complete 
argument on this issue.) 
POINT FOUR 
THE ISSUE OF APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN THE 
EMPLOYERS1 REINSURANCE FUND AND THE WORKERS1 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH AS ARGUED IN POINT 
FIVE IN DEFENDANTS' BRIEF IN CHIEF HAS BEEN 
RESOLVED BY SUBSEQUENT COURT OF APPEALS 
DECISION. 
Wicat Systems v. Pelligrini, 104 Utah Adv. Rep. 36, (Ct. App. 
3/22/89) (See Addendum Two hereto) is dispositive on the 
apportionment issues before this court. Defendants argued that 
issue and presented the appropriate apportionment percentages to 
the Court at Point Five pages 39-42 of their brief in chief. 
POINT FIVE 
THIS COURT SHOULD EXAMINE CAREFULLY THE 
ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLATIONS OF PROCEDURAL AND 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS BY THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION. 
Defendants/ Cross-Appellants thoroughly briefed the above 
subject at Point Six of its original brief. Therefore, little 
additional response is necessary. However, Harrison's "boys will 
be boys" approach to critical issues of basic fair play in Point 
XII of his reply brief must be addressed. This is not just an 
issue that applies to defendant employers. It is of vital 
importance to each applicant who presents a case for determination 
by the Commission. Administrative law judges should never be 
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placed in a position of defending their decisions before the 
commissioners reviewing the case. The judge's order should speak 
for itself without post decision analysis or summary before the 
judge's bosses—especially in the absence of the parties. No 
input in the decision making process from nonparties or parties 
should ever be allowed without giving all a chance to respond. 
It is that lack of a right to respond and present evidence 
that leads to the Commission's factually unsupported determination 
that: 
It is expected that the new change of policy 
regarding attorney fees shall produce the 
following results. 
1. Greater motivation for insurance 
carriers to invest more effort in 
investigation and early resolution of 
industrial claims; 
2. Reduction of litigation; 
3. Faster payment of compensation to injured 
workers and their families; 
4. An earlier return of injured workers to 
the workforce; and 
5. Reduced costs to employers because of 
reduced litigation expenses. 
(Commission's Order Affirming Supplemental 
Order Page Five, Addendum 3 to Brief of 
Defendants/Cross-Appellants) 
Not one piece of evidence was presented by Harrison or by the 
Commission to support the above five points. What is worse, even 
after a strong request, defendants were given no rebuttal 
opportunity. As argued previously, that is why the legislature is 
the proper forum to decide such wide reaching policy changes. At a 
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minimum the procedures of the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act 
should be followed. 
As compelling/ procedural and substantive due process 
require a fair notice and opportunity to rebut input into the 
judicial decision making process by nonparties. That opportunity 
was denied defendants over the strong dissent of Commissioner 
Hadley. Absent Commissioner Hadley's dissent, defendants may 
never have discovered the extent of nonparty participation. 
While it is appropriate for the Commissioners to discuss 
cases they are considering with Commission legal counsel/ 
administrative law judges not involved in the case and perhaps 
others such as law clerks (should they ever have any), the 
Commission should never, never allow even the appearance of an 
unfair practice creep into their judicial dealings. If the 
practices are as common as intimated by counsel for Mr. Harrison/ 
this Court should take the Commission to task. No party should 
ever have critical decisions made in an atmosphere that is 
anything but pristenely fair in substance and procedure. Absent 
that/ we allow the Commission unchecked powers never contemplated 
by the legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the Commission adding-on attorneys fees to a 
workers1 compensation award in this case is flawed legally/ 
factually and is poisoned by the majority of the Commission's 
blatant disregard for procedural and substantive due process. The 
legislature has not given the Commission any authority to strike 
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out on a new policy course regarding attorneys1 fees. No state in 
the United States has ever added attorneys' fees on to 
compensation awards judicially. That is the legislature's 
prerogative. Our legislature has during at least two different 
legislative sessions refused to give the Commission the authority 
it is attempting to judicially usurp from the legislature. 
Even if the legislature were to give such authority to the 
Commission, the Commission must follow the appropriate rule making 
procedures. It cannot retroactively by judicial fiat add to the 
costs of insurance all employers in the State are required by law 
to provide for their employees. Such action is an improper 
manipulation of the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act, supra. 
Furthermore, the majority opinion of the Commission shows a 
decided lack of understanding of procedural and substantive due 
process. The Commission 1) while sitting as a judicial review 
body permitted and/or required an administrative law judge to 
argue in support of his order; 2) permitted and considered briefs 
and arguments from nonparties without notice to or an opportunity 
for opposing parties to rebut the arguments; and 3) refused to 
allow additional evidence to be presented by the parties 
concerning the factually unsupported underlying assumptions of its 
dramatic change in policy. Such bold manipulations of the concept 
of administrative fair play bodes ill not only for defendant 
employers but also for injured workmen who present their cases to 
the Commission. 
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The issues before this Court do not involve whether or not it 
is a fair, reasonable and appropriate public policy to add on 
attorneys' fees to an injured workman's compensation award. 
Rather, they involve fundamental determinations of what the 
various roles of an administrative agency are in furthering the 
basic policies established by the State Legislature. The 
Commissioners are given limited authority to act as 
administrators, rules and regulations formulators and judges 
applying laws and finding facts in contested cases. When they 
confuse those roles and misinterpret the limits to those roles, 
very real dangers are created for the citizens of this State. - It 
is this Court's duty to correct the dangerous role crisis the 
majority of the Commissioner's have demonstrated in this case. 
The Commission's order should be reversed consistent with the 
arguments propounded by defendants and amici curiae in their 
briefs. 
DATED this fc_ day of May, 1989. 
WAYNE L. BLACK & ASSOCIATES 
of counsel to Callister, Duncan 
& Nebeker 
J&mes R. Black 
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1 LEGISLATIVE GENERAL COUNSEL 
2 ESS S. B. No. 147 sza 
3 Approved for Filing CRD 
4 Date 01-19-89 4:40 PM 
5 (ATTORNEYS FEES FOR ENHANCED WORKERS' 
6 COMPENSATION BENEFITS) 
7 1989 
8 GENERAL SESSION 
9 S. B. No. 147 By Alarik Myrin 
11 
y 
12 AN ACT RELATING TO WORKERS' COMPENSATION; PROVIDING FOR ATTORNEYS FEES 
13 AS COSTS IN ADDITION TO BENEFITS OR COMPENSATION AWARDED TO AN 
14 INJURED WORKER. 
15 THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS: 
16 AMENDS: 
17 35-1-87, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
18 35-2-41, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 
19 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
20 Section 1. Section 35-1-87, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended to 
21 read": 
22 35-1-87. (1) In all cases coming before the industrial commission 
23 in which attorneys have been employed, the commission is vested with full 
24 power to regulate and fix the attorneys' fees (of-saeh-attorneys). 
25 (2) If' the injured worker receives additional compensation or 
26 benefits as a result of the employment of an attorney, fanyl attorney fees 
2? shall be kosts: awarded/in addition to the compensation or benefits.' 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
I S. B. No. 147 01-19-89 4:40 PM 
1(3) If the injured worker does not receive additional compens 
[he shall pay attorney feesjp/ ^Trgc^fy 'fit**7 "7 
'Trom A*Ail_ 
Section 2. Section 35-2-41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is amended tof [respo 
read: 
35-2-41, (1) In all cases coming before the commission in which 
attorneys have been employed by the claimant^ the commission is vested 
with full power to regulate and fix the attorneys' fees [of-sach 
attorneys]• 
(2) If the injured worker receives additional compensation or 
benefits as a result of the employment of an attorney,fanylattorney fees 
CfhCA. OvT Of Q« ~~ 
shall be (costsi awarded/in addition to the compensation or benefits/ 
K3) If the injured worker does not receive additional compensation, 
[he shall pay attorney fees.l **» ftMt'rj fa^H ih*« be. &U.«R4,<I tew&k}*-
sF 
cr 
S* 
s* 
n 
to .^ _ 
a 
'cr 
o 
TISBBg^H^aeetlon prohibits the partiet to a claffiiH 
from stipulating to both the amount of and the party] 
snsibla for payment of the attorney fees^ 
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Salt Lake Tribune 
May 17, 1988 
New Appointee Stacks Commission 
Against Workers, Says AFL-CIO 
Bv Paul Roily 
Tribune Staff Writer 
A special Senate Confirmation Review Committee 
Monday rejected charges that Gov Norm Bangerter 
is slacking the State industrial Commission against 
workers The committee voted 2-1 in favor of the gov-
ernor's appointment to the commission 
"This is a slap ir the face to Utah's 800,000 working 
men and women/' argued Eddie Mayne, president of 
the Utah AFL-CIO. "We're getting a stacked industri-
al commission against employees and in favor of em-
ployers " 
TV furor was raised over Gov. Bangerters ap-
pointment of Thomas R Carlson to replace Lenms 
Nielson on the three-member commission Mr Niel-
son. who had come from a labor background, retired 
last month with a year left on his 6-year term 
The full Senate must vote Wednesday whether to 
confirm the appointment The three-member Confir-
mation Review Committee met for about three hours 
Monday to hear testimony and determine what kmd of 
recommendation to send to the Senate. 
Only See. Frances Farley voted against sending a 
favorable recommendation, telling Mr. Carlson she 
had high regard and deep respect for him, but die felt 
someone with a blue co&ar "hand*on" nothing per-
sons background stanld ho on the coma i mi is 
Mr. Carlton is a retised executive from Kennoeott, 
where he served as superintendent of the Kianocott 
mine He joins John Flora, who has a strong back-
ground in Equal Employment Opportunity issues and 
is a former aide to Sen. Orrin Hatch and Sieve Had-
ley, an attorney and Republican appointed to the com-
mission by former Gov. Calvin Hampton. 
"Historically and feudHtonalry; one of l i e throe 
commissioners comes from a working person's back-
ground," said Mr. Maine. "If Mr. Carlson is con-
firmed, none of the throe commissioners will be from 
that background." 
"We've never arguod that management shouldn't 
have someone on the commission," said Wayne Hol-
land, of the United Steefcrorkers of America. "On 
decisions that require date calls, there should he a 
balance." 
The State Industrial Commission acts as a quasi-
judicial body to hear various lands of labor-manage-
ment disputes and make administrative policy deter-
mining rules and regulations of the work place. 
The statute requires that no more than two of the 
commissioners can be of the same political party out 
that was not an issue at Mondays hearing Mr Flore? 
and Mr. Hadley are both Republicans, but everyone 
conceded Mr. Carlson is a well-respected Democrat. I 
He has been a Democratic voting district chairman [ 
and he ran for the Legislature as a Democrat in 1986 
And his supporters said he is highly qualified for 
the job, with his extensive experience in labor-man-
agen»mt mtues. j 
"This man is so qualified in executive manage- J 
ment," said Jack Chnstensen. of the Utah Mining As-
sociation. 'That is exactly what we need right now on 
the State industrial Cnmmiminn 
Attorney Jinks Dabnev said he was concerned be-
cause of the apparent desire to rush the appointment 
through while a highly controversial issue is pending 
before the commission I 
The commission, with Commissioner Nielson vot- j 
ing, ruled in a workers compensation case that atior- ] 
ney'sf*** should not be taken out of workers compeifc 
sattou benefits when a worker prevails on a disputed j 
claim before the commission. Instead, the attorney's j 
fees should be paid by the employer or the insurance j 
compam^according to the 2-1 ruling, with Commit 
Smntimn, CommisaionmMiefcoo retired and Com-
miasioners Hadley and Flora split their votes on % 
motion to rehear the case. ] 
The decision will ultimately mean hundreds of 
thmnandi of dollars to workers and industry in work-
ers compensation rtiipafcsi The ease at hand means 
$6,009 alone to die worker who won the dispute. J 
Mr. Dabney said the haste in which the appointment I 
is being made, and Mr. Qvtan's management back -^ I 
ground mains for an apponranee that he is being ap- I 
pointed to reverse that derision and put the attorney^- I 
fee burden back on the worker. 
Bat Sen. Paul Rogers noted the confirmation of Mr., 
Carlson will not be the deciding factor in that case 
because the issue will be appealed to the Utah Court. I 
of AppeaM anyway. | 
And Mr. Carlson assured the committee he will nob- f 
be predisposed to any position. ] 
"Everybody seems to know what I'm going to do on [ 
the commission except me," he said. "I don't know | 
how I'm going to decide cases, except to follow the law I 
and apply It" ( 
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Cite as 
104 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
VICAT SYSTEMS, and Hartford Insurance 
iroup, 
Petitioners, 
v. 
ylvia PELLEGRINI, Second Injury Fund of 
tah, and Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Respondents. 
o. 880218-CA 
[LED: March 22,1989 
dustrial Commission 
ITORNEYS: 
uart L. Poelman, Salt Lake City, for 
Petitioners. 
ie V. Boorman, Second Injury Fund, Salt 
Lake City, for Respondents. 
fore Judges Davidson, Billings, and Garff. 
OPINION 
tVIDSON, Judge: 
)n June 21, 1983, Sylvia Pellegrini, an 
Dloyee of Wicat Systems, injured her wrist 
le at work. In 1987, Pellegrini filed a claim 
l the Industrial Commission for permanent 
1 disability. The parties stipulated that 
egrini had a preexisting impairment of 
» prior to 1980, that she incurred an add-
lal 12^ o impairment prior to 1983, that the 
ry to h,er-wrist caused another 24ty imp-
tent,1 and that she was now, with the wrist 
7, permanently and totally disabled. The 
issue before the Administrative Law 
e was the proper apportionment between 
it Systems and the Second Injury Fund, 
e A.L.J, determined that Utah Code 
§35-1-69 (as amended 1984) contr-
, even though Pellegrini's injury occurred 
83, and so computed Wicat's share of the 
ty at 24/64ths or 37.5<7o. Wicat filed a 
>n for review claiming that the 1981 
n of section 35-1-69, which would 
placed its share of liability at 12/64ths 
75Vo, should have instead been applied, 
ommission denied Wicat's motion, 
sole issue before us is whether the 1984 
Iments to section 35-1-69 were proc-
or remedial such that they could be 
1 retroactively to an injury that occurred 
the effective date of the amendments.2 
Id that the amendments were not rem-
and, therefore, did not apply retroacti-
orkers' compensation cases, we gener-
>ply the law existing at the time of 
Mocre v. American Coal Co., 737 
P.2d 989, 990 (Utah 1987); Kennecott Corp. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 305, 308 (Utah 
App. 1987); Marshall v. Industrial Comm'n, 
704 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah 1985). Under this 
rule, the 1981 version of section 35-1-69 
would generally apply to Pellegrini's accident, 
since it was the law at the time she was 
injured. However, there are exceptions to this 
general rule. If amendments are procedural 
and do not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy 
vested or contractual rights, the amended 
statute may be applied retroactively to accid-
ents which occurred before the amendments 
became effective. Moore, 737 P.2d at 990. 
Furthermore, if the amendments 'deprive a 
party of rights or impose greater liability,0 but 
are enacted to *clarif[y] or amplif[y] how the 
earlier law should have been understood, "in 
other words, remedial in nature, the amend-
ments can still be retroactively applied. Ken-
necott Corp., 740 P.2d at 308. 
In the instant case, Wicat's responsibilities 
to pay workers' compensation to Pellegrini 
were similar to contractual obligations. Utah 
Constr. Co. v. Matheson, 534 P.2d 1238, 1239 
(Utah 1975). The level of Wicat's liability was 
set by the 1981 version of the statute. 
However, when the 1984 amendments were 
enacted they increased the percentage of liab-
ility of Wicat, thus enlarging those obligat-
ions. These kinds of amendments fit within 
the category held not to be retroactive. See 
Kennecott, 740 P.2d at 308; cf. Moore, 737 
P.2dat990. 
Pellegrini, however, argues that even though 
the 1984 amendments may have enlarged or 
increased Wicat's contractual obligations they 
were meant to clear up some confusion in the 
law present under section 35-1-69 as 
amended in 1981. Therefore, Pellegrini argues 
these amendments are remedial and retroac-
tive. Pellegrini refers to Kerans v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 713 P.2d 49 (Utah 1986), Jacobsen 
Construction v. Hair, 667 P.2d 25 (Utah 
1983), and Northwest Carriers, Inc. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 639 P.2d 138 (Utah 1981) to 
show this confusion. 
We are not persuaded by Pellegrini's argu-
ment. Hair required use of combined impair-
ment ratings in the equation rather than both 
whole and combined ratings. The other cases 
dealt with other closely connected issues, but 
did not directly contradict or overturn Hair. 
We find no confusion or ambiguity requiring 
clarification or amplification in these cases. 
The legislature changed the statute to require 
use of both whole person and combined imp-
airment ratings to determine liability and did 
so in the 1984 amendments. However, that 
fact by itself does not require us to conclude 
the legislature was clarifying or amplifying the 
preexisting law. 
Since the 1984 amendments to section 35-6-
69 cannot be applied retroactively, the law 
controlling Pellegrini's case was the law in 
effect at the time of her injury. According 
we apply the 1981 version of section 35 
69 as interpreted by the Hair case. Under ti 
formulation, Wicat's portion of liability f 
Pellegrini's injury is 12/64ths or 18.75Vo. 
The order of the Commission is reverse 
Liability is apportioned 12/64ths or 18.75* 
to Wicat and 52/64ths or 81.25«ft to tl 
Second Injury Fund. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. These are whole person impairment percentages. 
2. In 1988 section 35-1-69 (1984) was repealed 
The reenacted Utah Code Ann. §35-1-69 (1988 
abandoned the language in question. 
